

PLANO DE ENSINO

CARGA HORÁRIA	CRÉDITOS	CÓDIGO	SEM./ANO
60 H/A	04	DAD4108	1/ 2017

DISCIPLINA: Governance and incentives in supply chains

Linha de Pesquisa: Marketing e cadeias produtivas

PROFESSOR: Sandra Mara Schiavi Bánkuti

EMENTA: Study of the importance of supply chain coordination, under the lens of the Organizational Economics and Economics of Information. Consideration of institutional environment and institutional arrangements in chain design, competitiveness and performance. Analysis of supply chain considering New Institutional Economics, Transaction Cost Economics, Economics of Information, Principal-Agent and Agency costs.

CONTEÚDO PROGRAMÁTICO:

- Organizational Economics, Economics of Information and Supply Chain Coordination
- New institutional Economics (NIE) and institutional environment: the relevance of formal and informal rules
- Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and institutional arrangements
 - TCE in the context of Industrial Organization and Organizational Economics
 - TCE and its assumptions
 - Transaction attributes and governance structures
- Economics of information and Principal-Agent theory
 - Principal-Agent theory as complementary to TCE
 - The problem of Agency
 - Principal-Agent, information asymmetries and Agency costs
 - Adverse selection and moral hazard
 - Incentive mechanisms and enforcement mechanisms in economic transactions
 - Signaling and screening

CRITÉRIO DE AVALIAÇÃO:

- Individual presentations of bibliography (articles, working papers, books and book chapters) (30%)
- Individual written reviews of bibliography (articles, working papers, books and book chapters) (20%)
- Discussions and participation in class (10%)
- Final paper (40%)

BIBLIOGRAFIA:

BÁSICA E COMPLEMENTAR:

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